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Capturing equilibrium models in modal logic
Luis Fariñas del Cerro, Andreas Herzig, Ezgi Iraz Su ∗,1
Université de Toulouse, CNRS, IRIT, 118 Route de Narbonne, F-31062 Toulouse, Cedex 9, France
a b s t r a c t
Here-and-there models and equilibrium models were investigated as a semantical
framework for answer-set programming by Pearce, Valverde, Cabalar, Lifschitz,
Ferraris and others. The semantics of equilibrium logic is given in an indirect way:
the notion of an equilibrium model is defined in terms of quantification over here-
and-there models. We here give a direct semantics of equilibrium logic, stated for a
modal language embedding the language of equilibrium logic.
1. Introduction
A here-and-there (HT) model (H, T ) is a couple of sets of propositional variables, H (‘here’) and T
(‘there’) such that H ⊆ T . We understand the inclusion informally as H being weaker than T . The logical
language to talk about HT models has connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨, and→. The latter is interpreted in a non-classical
way and is therefore different from material implication ⊃. Its truth condition is:
H, T |= ϕ → ψ iff H, T |= ϕ ⊃ ψ and T, T |= ϕ ⊃ ψ,
where ⊃ is interpreted just as in classical propositional logic.2 HT models give semantics to an implication
with strength between intuitionistic and material implication. They were investigated by Pearce, Valverde,
Cabalar, Lifschitz, Ferraris, and others as the basis of equilibrium logic, the latter providing a semantical
framework for answer-set programming [20,19,22,5,6,14,18].
Equilibrium models of a formula, ϕ, are defined in an indirect way that is based on HT models: an
equilibrium model of ϕ is a set of propositional variables T such that
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2 Material implication ‘⊃’ here is just a shorthand enabling a concise formulation. To spell it out, its truth condition is: H, T |=
ϕ ⊃ ψ iff H, T Ó|= ϕ or H, T |= ψ.
1. T |= ϕ in propositional logic, and
2. there is no HT model (H, T ) such that H is strictly weaker than T and H, T |= ϕ.
Observe that the condition ‘T |= ϕ in propositional logic’ can be replaced by ‘T, T |= ϕ in the logic of
here-and-there’. To give an example, T = ∅ is an equilibrium model of p → ⊥ because (1) for the HT model
(∅, ∅) we have ∅, ∅ |= p → ⊥, and (2) there is no set H that is strictly included in the empty set. Moreover,
T = ∅ is the only equilibrium model of p → ⊥. To see this, suppose T is an equilibrium model for p → ⊥
for some T Ó= ∅. Then T cannot contain p, otherwise condition (1) would be violated. Therefore T contains
q for some q Ó= p, but then condition (2) is violated since ∅, T |= p → ⊥.
In the present paper we give a direct semantics of equilibrium logic in terms of a modal language extending
that of propositional logic by two unary modal operators, [T] and [S]. Roughly speaking, [T] allows to talk
about valuations3 that are at least as strong as the actual valuation; and [S] allows to talk about valuations
that are weaker than the actual valuation. Our modal language can be interpreted on HT models. However,
we also give a semantics in terms of Kripke models. We call our logic MEM: the Modal Logic of Equilibrium
Models.
We relate the language of equilibrium logic to our bimodal language by means of the Gödel translation,
tr , whose main clause is:
tr(ϕ → ψ) = [T]
(
tr(ϕ) ⊃ tr(ψ)
)
.
A first attempt to relate equilibrium logic to modal logic in the style of the present approach was presented
in [12]. We here extend and improve that paper by simplifying the translation.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our modal logic of equilibrium models,
MEM,4 syntactically, semantically and also axiomatically. In Section 3 we recall both the logic of here-
and-there and equilibrium logic. In Section 4 we define the Gödel translation, tr , from the language of the
logic of here-and-there to the language of MEM and prove its correctness: for every formula ϕ, ϕ is HT
valid if and only if tr(ϕ) is MEM valid. This theorem paves the way for the proof of the grand finale given
in Section 5: ϕ is a logical consequence of χ in equilibrium logic if and only if the modal formula
(
tr(χ) ∧ [S]¬tr(χ)
)
⊃ tr(ϕ)
is valid in MEM. It follows that ϕ has an equilibrium model if and only if tr(ϕ)∧ [S]¬tr(ϕ) is satisfiable in
the corresponding Kripke model. Section 6 makes a brief overview of our past, present and future interests.
They all appear in a line of work that aims to reexamine the logical foundations of equilibrium logic and
answer-set programming.
2. The modal logic of equilibrium models: MEM
We introduce the modal logic of equilibrium models, MEM, in the classical way: we start by defining its
bimodal language and its semantics. Then we axiomatise its validities.
2.1. Language
Throughout the paper we suppose P is a countably infinite set of propositional variables. The elements
of P are noted p, q, etc. Our language L[T],[S] is bimodal: it has two modal operators, [T] and [S]. Precisely,
L[T],[S] is defined by the following grammar:
3 Here, and in general in this paragraph, we use the term ‘valuation’ in the sense of a set of proposition variables.
4 To avoid confusion we could have used another name instead of MEM again. It should however be clear to the reader that the
modal logic we are talking about, here, is just slightly different from the one we introduced in [12].
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ϕ ⊃ ϕ | [T]ϕ | [S]ϕ,
where p ranges over P. The formula [T]ϕ may be read “ϕ holds at every possible there-world at least as
strong as the current world”, and [S]ϕ may be read “ϕ holds at every possible weaker or equal here-world”.
The set of propositional variables occurring in a formula ϕ is noted Pϕ.
The language L[T] is the set of L[T],[S]-formulas without the modal operator [S]. So the L[T]-formulas are
built from [T] and the Boolean connectives only.
We use the following standard abbreviations: ⊤
def
= ⊥ ⊃ ⊥, ¬ϕ
def
= ϕ ⊃ ⊥, ϕ ∨ ψ
def
= ¬ϕ ⊃ ψ, ϕ ∧ ψ
def
=
¬(ϕ ⊃ ¬ψ), and ϕ ≡ ψ
def
= (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⊃ ϕ). Moreover, 〈T〉ϕ and 〈S〉ϕ respectively abbreviate ¬[T]¬ϕ
and ¬[S]¬ϕ.
2.2. Kripke frames
Consider the class of Kripke frames 〈W, T ,S〉 such that
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• T ,S ⊆ W ×W are (binary) relations on W such that:
refl(T ) for every w, wT w;
alt2(T ) for every w, u, u
′, u′′, if wT u, wT u′ and wT u′′
then u = u′ or u = u′′ or u′ = u′′;
trans(T ) for every w, u, v, if wT u and uT v then wT v;
refl2(S) for every w, u, if wSu then uSu;
wtriv2(S) for every w, u, v, if wSu and uSv then u = v;
wmconv(T ,S) for every w, u, if wT u then w = u or uSw;
mconv(S, T ) for every w, u, if wSu then uT w.
We call a frame 〈W, T ,S〉 satisfying the above-mentioned constraints a MEM frame. Let us explain these
constraints informally.
To begin with, the first three constraints are about the relation T . The constraints refl(T ) and alt2(T )
say respectively that a world w is T -reflexive and has at most two T -successors. To sum it up, a world w is
either a single T -loop or has an accompanying T -accessible world. Then the transitivity constraint, trans(T ),
makes that the neighbouring T -accessible world is a single T -loop. Briefly, these constraints together imply
the following constraint about the relation T :
depth1(T ): for every w, u, v, if wT u and uT v then w = u or u = v.
In words, every world can be reached in at most one T -step.
The next two constraints are about the relation S. Let S(u) = {v: uSv}. For any w, u, if wSu then the
constraint refl2(S) gives us u ∈ S(u). The constraint wtriv2(S) tells us that when wSu then we must have
S(u) = ∅ or S(u) = {u}. Together, they say that if wSu then S(u) = {u}: any world we access by the
relation S can see itself through S, but none of the others. At this point, it is worth noting that S is trivially
transitive due to wtriv2(S). It then also follows from this constraint that every world can be reached in at
most one S-step. In other words, the relation S is of depth 1.
The next two constraints involve both T and S. We obtain from the weak mixed conversion constraint,
wmconv(T ,S), that T is contained in S−1∪∆W , where ∆W = {(w, w): w ∈ W} is the diagonal of W ×W .
Moreover, the mixed conversion constraint, mconv(S, T ), says that S is contained in T −1. As a result,
together with refl(T ) these two constraints give us T = S−1 ∪∆W .
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of MEM-frames, for n > 0. The two singleton graphs are for n = 0. The rightmost graph is for
n > 1, where f(n) = 2n represents the number of S-arrows in the diagram.
Let us sum up the constraints that we have introduced so far: the T relation is a tree of height 0 or 1,
and S is the converse of T , except for the root. In our frames, any root w is characterised by the fact that
T (w) \ {w} is empty. MEM frames basically have the form of one of the diagrams depicted in Fig. 1. The
constraints wmconv(T ,S), refl2(S), wtriv2(S), refl(T ) and alt2(T ) imply that for every w, T (w) ∩ S(w) is
equal to either the empty-set or the singleton {w}.
The following properties hold for every MEM frame 〈W, T ,S〉. First, the relation T is serial, i.e., for all
w there is a u such that wT u. Formally, this property is guaranteed by the constraint refl(T ). Moreover, T is
directed, i.e., for every w, u, v, if wT u and wT v then there exists z such that uT z and vT z. This follows
from the constraints refl(T ) and alt2(T ). Besides, T is also anti-symmetric, that is to say, for every w, u, if
wT u and uT w then w = u. This follows from the constraints wmconv(T ,S) and wtriv2(S). Together with
mconv(S, T ), this implies that S is anti-symmetric, too. However, T is not euclidean: we may have wT u
and wT w without uT w, and therefore the condition ‘for every w, u, v, if wT u and wT v then uT v’ does
not hold in general. Finally, the relations T and S are trivially idempotent.5 We obtain the idempotence
property of T from depth1(T ), while we get that of S through wtriv2(S). As a last word, all of the properties
above can be visualised from the diagram above; in addition, we can also see that the properties of seriality,
euclideanity, and directedness don’t hold for the relation S.
2.3. Kripke models
We interpret the formulas of our language L[T],[S] in a class of Kripke models that has to satisfy some
particular constraints.
Consider the class of Kripke models M = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 such that:
• 〈W, T ,S〉 is an MEM frame;
• V is a valuation on W mapping all possible worlds w ∈ W to sets of propositional variables Vw ⊆ P
such that:
heredity(S) for every w, u, if wSu then Vu ⊆ Vw;
neg(S, T ) for every w, there exists u such that: wT u and if Vu Ó= ∅
then for every non-empty P ⊆ Vu, there is v satisfying
uSv and Vv = Vu \ P.
A quadruple M = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 satisfying all the conditions above is called an MEM model.
Now let us comment a bit on the constraints heredity(S) and neg(S, T ). They involve not only the
relations S and T , but also the valuation V . The constraint heredity(S) is just as the heredity constraint
of intuitionistic logic, except that S is the inverse of the intuitionistic relation. The neg(S, T ) constraint
basically says that if w is the root of a tree and has a non-empty valuation then the set of worlds that are
5 A relation r is idempotent if r ◦ r = r, where ◦ is the relation composition operation.
accessible from w via the relation S contains all those worlds u whose valuations Vu are strictly included
in Vw. In every MEM model, if singleton points appear (such as in the leftmost two graphs in Fig. 1) then
they should certainly have an empty valuation.
The following properties include the valuation as well.
Proposition 1. Let M = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 be an MEM model.
1. For every w, u, if wT u then Vw ⊆ Vu.
2. For every w, if T (w)\{w} is empty, then the set {Vu: wSu} equals either {V : V ⊆ Vw} or {V : V ⊂ Vw}.
The first property can be proved from wmconv(T ,S) and heredity(S). The second property is due to
heredity(S), neg(S, T ) and refl(T ). In words: for a root point w,6 the set of valuations associated to the
worlds that are accessible from w via S is either the set of subsets of Vw, 2
Vw , or the set of strict subsets of
Vw, 2
Vw \ {Vw}. This property will be used later in the paper in the proof of Theorem 12.
2.4. Truth conditions
The semantics of our bimodal logic is fairly standard, the relation T interpreting the modal operator [T]
and the relation S interpreting the modal operator [S]. The truth conditions are:
M, w |= p iff p ∈ Vw;
M, w Ó|= ⊥;
M, w |= ϕ ⊃ ψ iff M, w Ó|= ϕ or M, w |= ψ;
M, w |= [T]ϕ iff M, u |= ϕ for every u such that wT u;
M, w |= [S]ϕ iff M, u |= ϕ for every u such that wSu.
We say that ϕ has an MEM model when M, w |= ϕ for some model M and world w in M . We also say
that ϕ is MEM satisfiable. Furthermore, ϕ is MEM valid if and only if M, w |= ϕ for every model M and
possible world w in M .
The next proposition says that to check satisfiability it suffices to just consider models with finite valua-
tions.
Proposition 2. Let ϕ be an L[T],[S]-formula. Let M = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 be an MEM model. Let the valuation
V ϕ be defined as follows:
V ϕw = Vw ∩ Pϕ, for every w ∈ W.
Then Mϕ = 〈W, T ,S, V ϕ〉 is also an MEM model and
M, w |= ϕ if and only if Mϕ, w |= ϕ, for every w ∈ W.
Proof. First, we prove that if ϕ is a subformula of χ then M, w |= ϕ if and only if Mχ, w |= ϕ, by induction
on the form of ϕ. The base case and the Boolean cases are routine. As for the modalities, we only give the
proof for the case where ϕ is of the form [T]ψ, the case [S]ψ being similar. We have:
6 Remember that in an MEM frame, the property T (w) \ {w} = ∅ characterises that w is the root of a tree. Moreover, when
T (w) \ {w} Ó= ∅ then the singleton T (w) \ {w} contains the root.
Table 1
Axiomatisation of MEM.
K([T]) the axioms and the inference rules of modal logic K for [T]
K([S]) the axioms and the inference rules of modal logic K for [S]
T([T]) [T]ϕ ⊃ ϕ
Alt2([T]) [T]ϕ ∨ [T](ϕ ⊃ ψ) ∨ [T](ϕ ∧ ψ ⊃ ⊥)
4([T]) [T]ϕ ⊃ [T][T]ϕ
T2([S]) [S]([S]ϕ ⊃ ϕ)
WTriv2([S]) [S](ϕ ⊃ [S]ϕ)
WMConv([T], [S]) ϕ ⊃ [T](ϕ ∨ 〈S〉ϕ)
MConv([S], [T]) ϕ ⊃ [S]〈T〉ϕ
Heredity([S]) 〈S〉ϕ+ ⊃ ϕ+ for ϕ+ a positive Boolean formula
Neg([S], [T]) 〈T〉(ϕ+ ∧ ψ) ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉(¬ϕ+ ∧ ψ) for ϕ+ a positive Boolean formula such that Pϕ+ ∩ Pψ = ∅
M, w |= [T]ψ iff M, u |= ψ for every u such that wT u
iff M [T]ψ, u |= ψ for every u such that wT u (by I.H.)
iff M [T]ϕ, w |= [T]ψ.
Let us show that Mϕ is also an MEM model. The frame constraints are only about the accessibility
relations and are clearly preserved because we just modify the valuation. As for the constraints involving the
valuation, the model Mϕ satisfies heredity(S) constraint: suppose wSu; as M satisfies heredity(S) we have
Vu ⊆ Vw; hence V
ϕ
u ⊆ V
ϕ
w as well. Finally, the model M
ϕ also satisfies the constraint neg(S, T ): for every
w ∈ W , by the constraints refl(T ) and alt2(T ) there exists either one or two u such that wT u; in the former
case, u = w whereas in the latter, we choose u different from w; for such u’s, let V ϕu = Vu ∩Pϕ and P ⊆ V
ϕ
u
be non-empty; then since M satisfies the neg(S, T ) constraint there is v with uSv satisfying Vv = Vu \ P ;
clearly, for that v we also have V ϕv = V
ϕ
u \P since V
ϕ
v = Vv∩Pϕ = (Vu\P )∩Pϕ = (Vu∩Pϕ)\P = V
ϕ
u \P . ✷
Remark 1. Observe that Proposition 2 should not be confused with the finite model property (f.m.p.) of
modal logics: the f.m.p. is about finiteness of the set of possible worlds, while Proposition 2 is about finiteness
of valuations. We might call the latter finite valuation property (f.v.p.).
2.5. Axiomatics, provability, and completeness
The main purpose of this section is to give an axiomatisation of the MEM validities and to prove its
completeness.
We start by defining the fragment of positive Boolean formulas of L[T],[S] by the following grammar:
ϕ+ ::= p | ϕ+ ∧ ϕ+ | ϕ+ ∨ ϕ+.
We immediately observe that every positive Boolean formula is falsifiable. (Note that this holds because ⊤
is not a positive Boolean formula.)
Now we are ready to give our axiomatisation of MEM. The axiom schemas and the inference rules are
listed in Table 1.
The axiom schemas T([T]), Alt2([T]) and 4([T]) are well-known from modal logic textbooks. We observe
that Alt2([T]) could be replaced by the axiom schema 〈T〉(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ 〈T〉(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ⊃ [T]ϕ, or even (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧
〈T〉(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ⊃ [T]ϕ.
The axiom schema WTriv2([S]) is a weakening of the triviality axiom for [S], i.e., [S]ϕ ≡ ϕ, yet the
axiom schemas T2([S]) and WTriv2([S]) can be combined into the single axiom, [S]([S]ϕ ≡ ϕ) that we call
‘triviality in the second step’ axiom, and symbolise with Triv2([S]).
The weak mixed conversion axiom, WMConv([T], [S]), and the mixed conversion axiom, MConv([S], [T]),
are familiar from tense logics.
Finally, the schema Heredity([S]) captures the heredity constraint, heredity(S). Note that it could be
replaced by the axiom 〈S〉p ⊃ p, where p is a propositional variable. It could also be replaced by the axiom
schema ¬ϕ+ ⊃ [S]¬ϕ+, for ϕ+ a positive Boolean formula. The schema Neg([S], [T]) ensures that the modal
operator [S] quantifies over all strict subsets of the actual valuation under some restrictions.
Remark 2. T([T]) and Alt2([T]) give us that for every w, T (w) contains w, and has at least 1 and at
most 2 elements. If T (w) contains two elements, say T (w) = {w, u} where w Ó= u, then 4([T]) implies that
T (u) = {u}. Moreover, WMConv([T], [S]) guarantees that u is always S-related to w when it exists.
Finally, the notions of proof and of provability of a formula are defined as it is in any modal logic.
For example, it is possible to prove the schema Depth1([T]) (corresponding to the constraint depth1(T )),
i.e., ¬ϕ ⊃ [T](ϕ ⊃ [T]ϕ). The proof uses the axiom schemas T([T]), Alt2([T]), and 4([T]).
As another example, we give the proof of the schema that corresponds to the heredity condition for T ,
i.e., Heredity([T]): ϕ+ ⊃ [T]ϕ+, for ϕ+ a positive Boolean formula. This will be helpful in the proof of the
grand finale, Theorem 12.
Proposition 3. The schema Heredity([T]), i.e., ϕ+ ⊃ [T]ϕ+, for ϕ+ a positive Boolean formula, is provable.
Proof.
1. 〈S〉ϕ+ ⊃ ϕ+ (Heredity([S]))
2. ϕ+ ⊃ [T](ϕ+ ∨ 〈S〉ϕ+) (WMConv([T], [S]))
3. ϕ+ ⊃ [T]ϕ+ (from 1 and 2 by K[S]).
✷
Heredity([T]) ensures that wT u implies Vw ⊆ Vu, i.e., the heredity condition for T .
Here is one more schema just concerning the T relation.
Proposition 4. The schema, 2([T]), i.e., 〈T〉[T]ϕ ⊃ [T]〈T〉ϕ is provable.
Proof.
1. 〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ⊃ 〈T〉¬ϕ (from T([T]) by K([T]))
2. 〈T〉[T]ϕ ⊃ 〈T〉([T]ϕ ∧ ϕ) (from T([T]) by K([T]))
3. [T]ϕ ∨ [T](ϕ ⊃ 〈T〉¬ϕ) ∨ [T]((ϕ ∧ 〈T〉¬ϕ) ⊃ ⊥) (Alt2([T]))
4. (〈T〉¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉(ϕ ∧ [T]ϕ)) ⊃ [T](ϕ ⊃ [T]ϕ) (from 3 by K([T]))
5. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]ϕ) ⊃ [T](ϕ ⊃ [T]ϕ) (from 1, 2 and 4 by K([T]))
6. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]ϕ) ⊃ [T](¬ϕ ⊃ [T]¬ϕ) (from 5 by K([T]))
7. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]ϕ) ⊃ [T]([T]ϕ ∨ [T]¬ϕ) (from 5 and 6 by K([T]))
8. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]ϕ) ⊃ ([T][T]ϕ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ) (from 7 by T([T]) and 4([T]))
9. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ [T][T]ϕ) ⊃ 〈T〉[T]⊥ (by K([T]))
10. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ [T][T]¬ϕ) ⊃ [T][T]¬ϕ (by K([T]))
11. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ ([T][T]ϕ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ)) ⊃ (〈T〉[T]⊥ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ) (from 9 and 10)
12. (〈T〉[T]ϕ ∧ ([T][T]ϕ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ)) ⊃ (〈T〉[T]⊥ ∨ [T][T]ϕ) (from 11 by K([T]))
13. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]ϕ ∧ ([T][T]ϕ ∨ [T][T]¬ϕ)) ⊃ (〈T〉[T]⊥ ∨ ([T][T]ϕ ∧ [T][T]¬ϕ))
(from 11 and 12 by K([T]))
14. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]ϕ) ⊃ (〈T〉[T]⊥ ∨ ([T][T]ϕ ∧ [T][T]¬ϕ)) (from 8 and 13)
15. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]ϕ) ⊃ (〈T〉[T]⊥ ∨⊥) (from 14 by K([T]) and T([T]))
16. (〈T〉[T]¬ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]ϕ) ⊃ 〈T〉⊥ (from 15 by T([T]) and K([T]))
17. (〈T〉[T]ϕ ∧ 〈T〉[T]¬ϕ) ⊃ ⊥ (from 16 by K([T]))
18. 〈T〉[T]ϕ ⊃ [T]〈T〉ϕ (from 17 by K([T])).
✷
Let us turn to schemas about [S]. For example, 4([S]): [S]ϕ ⊃ [S][S]ϕ is a direct consequence of
WTriv2([S]). The proof is in one step by the K([S]) axiom and modus ponens (MP).
Finally, we state and prove a schema regarding both operators [T] and [S] that will be useful in the
completeness proof.
Lemma 5. The following formula schema is provable:
Neg′
(
[S], [T]
)
〈T〉
(( ∧
p∈P
p
)
∧
( ∧
q∈Q
q
))
⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉
(( ∧
p∈P
¬p
)
∧
( ∧
q∈Q
q
))
for P, Q ⊆ P finite, P Ó= ∅, and P ∩Q = ∅.
Proof. Neg′([S], [T]) can be proved using the axiom schema Neg([S], [T]) by standard modal logic principles,
i.e., by K([T]). Suppose P and Q are finite subsets of P such that P Ó= ∅ and P ∩Q = ∅. The implication
(( ∧
p∈P
p
)
∧
( ∧
q∈Q
q
))
⊃
(( ∨
p∈P
p
)
∧
( ∧
q∈Q
q
))
is valid in classical propositional logic. Then Neg′([S], [T]) follows through the argument below:
1. (
∧
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q) ⊃ (
∨
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q) (tautology)
2. 〈T〉((
∧
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) ⊃ 〈T〉((
∨
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) (from 1 by K[T])
3. 〈T〉((
∨
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉((¬
∨
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) (Neg([S], [T]))
4. 〈T〉((
∧
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉((
∧
p∈P ¬p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) (from 2–3 by K[T]).
✷
Our axiomatisation is sound and complete.
Theorem 6. Let ϕ be an L[T],[S]-formula. Then ϕ is MEM valid if and only if ϕ is provable from the axioms
and the inference rules of MEM.
Proof. Soundness is proved as usual. We just consider the proof of axiom schema Neg([S], [T]). Let ϕ+ be
a positive Boolean formula such that Pϕ+ ∩ Pψ = ∅. Suppose
M, w |= 〈T〉
(
ϕ+ ∧ ψ
)
(∗).
Put ϕ+ in conjunctive normal form (CNF), and let κ = (
∨
P ) be a clause of this CNF, for some P ⊆ Pϕ+ .
Observe that P Ó= ∅ by the definition of positive Boolean formulas and CNF. Now, we need to consider two
cases (according to Remark 2 above).
Case (1). Let T (w) \ {w} = ∅. Hence T (w) = {w} by the reflexivity of T . Then from (∗) we obtain that
M, w |= ϕ+ ∧ ψ (∗∗). Moreover, M, w |= ϕ+ implies that Vw Ó= ∅. In addition, non-emptiness of Vw yields
that w is not a singleton point (because singleton points always have an empty valuation; otherwise that
would contradict neg(S, T )). Now, take Pw = P ∩ Vw. We have Pw Ó= ∅ because M, w |= κ (since we have
M, w |= ϕ+). As M satisfies the constraint neg(S, T ), there exists u with wT u, but since T (w) = {w}
we have u = w. Since Vw Ó= ∅, according to the negatable constraint, for non-empty Pw ⊆ Vw, there is v
such that wSv and Vv = Vw \ Pw. Since Pw ∩ Vv = ∅, we also have P ∩ Vv = ∅ (because Vv ⊆ Vw, but
P \ Pw * Vw). Hence, M, v Ó|= κ. As a result, M, v Ó|= ϕ+ either. So M, v |= ¬ϕ+. In addition, M, v |= ψ
because M, w |= ψ by (∗∗), Pϕ+ ∩ Pψ = ∅, and Vv = Vw \ Pw. Hence, we deduce that M, v |= ¬ϕ+ ∧ ψ, but
wSv, so we also have M, w |= 〈S〉(¬ϕ+ ∧ ψ). Finally, it is trivial to conclude that M, w |= 〈T〉〈S〉(¬ϕ+ ∧ ψ)
since T (w) = {w}.
Case (2). Let T (w) \ {w} Ó= ∅. So there exists u with u Ó= w and wT u. Moreover, u is uniquely determined
(see Remark 2). Then we choose u, but not w, as a candidate to satisfy the formula ϕ+ ∧ψ (see (∗) above).
Hence, we obtain from (∗) that M, u |= ϕ+ ∧ ψ. The proof follows almost the same reasoning as in the
previous case and we leave it to the reader. Following the same steps for u, we obtain M, u |= 〈S〉(¬ϕ+∧ψ).
Then M, w |= 〈T〉〈S〉(¬ϕ+ ∧ ψ) results automatically.
To prove completeness w.r.t. MEM models we use canonical models [3,7]. Let ϕ be a consistent L[T],[S]
formula. We define the canonical model Mϕ = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 as follows. W is the set of maximal consistent
sets of MEM. The accessibility relations T and S are such that:
wT u iff
{
ψ: [T]ψ ∈ w
}
⊆ u
wSu iff
{
ψ: [S]ψ ∈ w
}
⊆ u;
The valuation V is defined by Vw = w ∩ Pϕ, for every w ∈ W . Let us prove that the canonical model
Mϕ = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 is a legal MEM model. It is standard to prove that Mϕ satisfies the constraints
associated to the axioms T([T]), Alt2([T]), 4([T]), T2([S]), and WTriv2([S]).
• The weak mixed conversion axiom WMConv([T], [S]) implies that the constraint wmconv(T ,S) is sat-
isfied in the canonical model: suppose that wT u and w Ó= u; we want to show uSw; assume for a
contradiction that u isn’t S-related to w (∗); then there exists ϕ such that [S]ϕ ∈ u and ¬ϕ ∈ w; next,
since w Ó= u, there exists ψ with ψ ∈ w and ¬ψ ∈ u; as w is maximal consistent ¬ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ w, but
so is any instance of WMConv([T], [S]) as well; hence (¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊃ [T]((¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ 〈S〉(¬ϕ ∧ ψ)) ∈ w,
and then (¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ 〈S〉(¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ u first through (MP) and then using our initial assumption wT u;
¬ψ ∈ u implies ¬ψ∨ϕ ∈ u, but then so must 〈S〉(¬ϕ∧ψ) ∈ u; using maximal consistency of u we assert
〈S〉(¬ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊃ (〈S〉¬ϕ ∧ 〈S〉ψ) ∈ u as well, but then so is 〈S〉¬ϕ ∧ 〈S〉ψ ∈ u, which gives us the desired
contradiction; eventually uSw.
• The mixed conversion axiom MConv([S], [T])7 guarantees that the constraint mconv(S, T ) holds in the
canonical model: let wSu and assume ϕ is such that [T]ϕ ∈ u; then by the definition of S, 〈S〉[T]ϕ ∈ w;
since w is maximal consistent, any instance of MConv([S], [T]) is in w, so is 〈S〉[T]ϕ ⊃ ϕ; therefore
through (MP) we get ϕ ∈ w and this completes the proof.
• The axiom schema Heredity([S]) ensures that the canonical model satisfies the constraint heredity(S),
viz. that for every w, u, wSu implies Vu ⊆ Vw: indeed, suppose wSu and p ∈ Vu = u ∩ Pϕ; as w is a
maximal consistent set, it contains all instances of Heredity([S]), in particular, 〈S〉p ⊃ p; since wSu we
also obtain 〈S〉p ∈ w from p ∈ u. (Otherwise, w being maximal consistent, it includes ¬〈S〉p = [S]¬p;
since wSu by assumption, we get ¬p ∈ u, contradicting the fact that u is consistent since p ∈ u as well.)
Hence, p ∈ w, and so p ∈ w ∩ Pϕ = Vw.
• The negatable axiom Neg([S], [T]) guarantees that neg(S, T ) holds in the canonical model: to see this
take an arbitrary w ∈ W ; since the canonical model satisfies the constraints refl(T ) and alt2(T ) (as the
reader can easily check), we go through the following two cases:
7 It is a bit handier to work with the contrapositive of the axiom schema MConv([S], [T]) here, i.e., with 〈S〉[T]ϕ ⊃ ϕ.
Case (i). Let T (w) \ {w} = ∅. Hence T (w) = {w} by the reflexivity of T . (Then it is trivial to conclude
that there exists u such that wT u, and moreover u = w.) If Vw = w ∩ Pϕ = ∅ (i.e., if w contains the
negations of the propositional variables of ϕ) then the constraint trivially holds. Let Vw Ó= ∅. Suppose
P ⊆ Vw = w ∩ Pϕ is such that P Ó= ∅. Then we choose Q = Vw \ P . Since P, Q ⊆ P are finite with
P Ó= ∅ and P ∩ Q = ∅, now we can use Lemma 5. As w is a maximal consistent set it includes
(
∧
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q), but then also 〈T〉((
∧
p∈P p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) since T (w) = {w}. Next, again since
w is maximal consistent, by Lemma 5 it also has every instance of Neg′([S], [T]), so it must contain
〈T〉〈S〉((
∧
p∈P ¬p)∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) as well. By our initial assumption, 〈S〉((
∧
p∈P ¬p)∧ (
∧
q∈Q q)) ∈ w. Thus
we can conclude that there is v ∈ W such that wSv. Furthermore v contains (
∧
p∈P ¬p) ∧ (
∧
q∈Q q).
Therefore, P ∩v = ∅ and Q ⊆ v, but the canonical model satisfies the heredity(S) constraint (see above),
so Vv ⊆ Vw. We know that P, Q ⊆ Pϕ are mutually exclusive and cover Vw. Also, Q ⊆ v and Q ⊆ Pϕ
implies Q ⊆ v ∩ Pϕ = Vv. On the other hand, Vv ∩ P = (v ∩ Pϕ) ∩ P = v ∩ (Pϕ ∩ P ) = v ∩ P = ∅.
(Alternatively, note that Vv = v ∩ Pϕ = Q, so apparently, Vv ∩ P = Q ∩ P = ∅.) It follows that
Vv = Q = Vw \ P and we are done.
Case (ii). Now suppose T (w) \ {w} Ó= ∅. It is obvious from our assumption that there exists u such that
u Ó= w and wT u. Moreover, since the canonical model satisfies the constraints refl(T ) and alt2(T ) (which
is easy to prove), we claim that T (w) = {w, u}. Additionally, trans(T ) also holds in the canonical model
(again easily verified), so we further have T (u) = {u}. Therefore the rest of the proof can basically be
done in the same way as before.
To sum it up, the canonical model Mϕ satisfies all constraints, and is therefore a legal MEM model.
Moreover, as ϕ is a consistent MEM formula, there must exist a maximal MEM consistent set w ⊆ W
containing ϕ. It can then be proved in the standard way that Mϕ, w |= ϕ. ✷
3. HT logic and equilibrium logic
In this section we recall HT logic and equilibrium logic.
3.1. The language L→
The language L→ is common to HT logic and equilibrium logic. It is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ⊥ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ → ϕ,
where p ranges over P. The other Boolean connectives are defined as abbreviations in the same way as in
our bimodal language: negation ¬ϕ is defined as ϕ → ⊥, and ⊤ is defined as ⊥ → ⊥.
3.2. Here-and-there logic
A HT model is a couple (H, T ) such that H ⊆ T ⊆ P. The sets H and T are respectively called ‘here’
and ‘there’.
Let (H, T ) be an HT model. The truth conditions are as follows:
H, T |= p iff p ∈ H;
H, T Ó|= ⊥;
H, T |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff H, T |= ϕ and H, T |= ψ;
H, T |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff H, T |= ϕ or H, T |= ψ;
H, T |= ϕ → ψ iff (H, T Ó|= ϕ or H, T |= ψ) and (T, T Ó|= ϕ or T, T |= ψ).
When H, T |= ϕ we say that (H, T ) is an HT model of ϕ. A formula ϕ is HT valid if and only if every
HT model is also an HT model of ϕ.
We can claim as a consequence of the following lemma that the finite model property (perhaps better
called a finite valuation property) holds for HT logic: if an L→-formula ϕ has an HT model then there also
exists a pair of finite here and there sets (H, T ) such that H, T |= ϕ. This is the counterpart of Proposition 2.
Lemma 7. Let ϕ be an L→-formula and let q be a propositional variable such that q /∈ Pϕ. Then H, T |= ϕ
iff H, T ∪ {q} |= ϕ iff H ∪ {q}, T ∪ {q} |= ϕ.
3.3. Equilibrium logic
An equilibrium model of an L→-formula ϕ is a set of propositional variables T ⊆ P such that:
1. (T, T ) is an HT model of ϕ;
2. no (H, T ) with H ⊂ T is an HT model of ϕ.
Here are three examples. First, the empty set is the only equilibrium model of both ⊤ and ¬p: for any
q ∈ P, {q} is neither an equilibrium model of ⊤ nor of ¬p. Second, as ∅, {p} |= ¬p → q, the set {p} is not
an equilibrium model of ¬p → q. Third, {q} is an equilibrium model of ¬p → q because {q}, {q} |= ¬p → q
and ∅, {q} Ó|= ¬p → q.
For two L→-formulas ϕ and χ, we say that ϕ is a consequence of χ in equilibrium models, written χ |≈ ϕ,
if and only if for every equilibrium model T of χ, (T, T ) is an HT model of ϕ. For example, ⊤ |≈ ¬p and
¬p |≈ ⊤. We also have q |≈ ¬p → q and ¬p → q |≈ q.
4. From HT logic and equilibrium logic to the modal logic, MEM
In this section we are going to translate HT logic and equilibrium logic into our logic MEM.
4.1. Translating L→ to L[T]
To warm up, let us translate the language L→ of both HT logic and equilibrium logic into the sub-language
L[T] of MEM. We recursively define the mapping tr as follows:
tr(p) = p for p ∈ P;
tr(⊥) = ⊥;
tr(ϕ ∧ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∧ tr(ψ);
tr(ϕ ∨ ψ) = tr(ϕ) ∨ tr(ψ);
tr(ϕ → ψ) = [T](tr(ϕ) ⊃ tr(ψ)).
This translation is similar to the Gödel translation from intuitionistic logic to modal logic S4 whose main
clause is tr(ϕ → ψ) = ✷(tr(ϕ) ⊃ tr(ψ)), where ✷ is an S4 operator (just as the [T] operator of our bimodal
logic).
Here are some examples.
tr(⊤) = tr(⊥ → ⊥) = [T](⊥ ⊃ ⊥).
This is equivalent to ⊤ in any normal modal logic.
tr(¬p) = tr(p → ⊥) = [T](p ⊃ ⊥).
This is equivalent to [T]¬p in any normal modal logic.
tr(p ∨ ¬p) = tr(p) ∨ tr(p → ⊥) = p ∨ [T](p ⊃ ⊥).
This is equivalent to p ∨ [T]¬p in any normal modal logic.
4.2. From HT logic to MEM
On HT models, the fragment L[T] of the language L[T],[S] is at least as expressive as L→, modulo the
translation tr .
Proposition 8. Let T be a set of propositional variables, and let MT = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 be a quadruple such that:
W = 2T ;
Vh = h for every h ∈ W ;
T = ∆W ∪
(
W × {T}
)
=
{
(x, y) ∈ W ×W : x = y or y = T
}
;
S = ∆(W\{T}) ∪
(
{T} ×
(
W \ {T}
))
= T −1 \
{
(T, T )
}
.
Then MT is an MEM model, and H, T |= ϕ if and only if MT , H |= tr(ϕ), for every H ⊆ T and
L→-formula ϕ.
In the last line, S is defined as the (relative) difference between the inverse of T and {(T, T )}. For example,
for T = ∅ we obtain M∅ = (W, T ,S, V ) with W = {∅}, T = {(∅, ∅)}, and S = ∅; and for T = {p} we obtain
M{p} = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 with W = {∅, {p}}, T = {(∅, ∅), (∅, {p}), ({p}, {p})}, and S = {(∅, ∅), ({p}, ∅)}.
Proof. First, MT is a legal MEM model: MT satisfies all constraints by construction, i.e., refl(T ), alt2(T ),
trans(T ), refl2(S), wtriv2(S), wmconv(T ,S), mconv(S, T ), heredity(S), and neg(S, T ). Second, one can
prove by a straightforward induction on the form of ϕ that H, T |= ϕ iff MT , H |= tr(ϕ), for every H ⊆ T . ✷
Proposition 9. Let M = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 be an MEM model. Then for every w ∈ W and every L→-formula ϕ
we have:
1. If T (w) \ {w} = ∅ then M, w |= tr(ϕ) if and only if Vw, Vw |= ϕ;
2. If T (w) \ {w} Ó= ∅ then M, w |= tr(ϕ) if and only if Vw, Vu |= ϕ for the uniquely determined
u ∈ T (w) \ {w}.
Proof. As expected we go through induction on the form of ϕ in both cases. For the first case T (w)\{w} = ∅,
the base, the Boolean and even the intuitionistic implication steps are straightforward. For the second case,
suppose T (w) \ {w} Ó= ∅. Then T (w) \ {w} contains exactly one element, say u (see Remark 2). The base
and the Boolean cases are still easy, and only the case of intuitionistic implication is worth analysing. We
sketch of the argument and leave the gaps to the reader. We have:
M, w |= tr(ψ1 → ψ2) iff M, w |= [T](tr(ψ1) ⊃ tr(ψ2))
iff M, w |= tr(ψ1) ⊃ tr(ψ2) and M, u |= tr(ψ1) ⊃ tr(ψ2)
iff Vw, Vu |= ψ1 ⊃ ψ2 and Vu, Vu |= ψ1 ⊃ ψ2 (by I.H. and using Remark 2)
iff Vw, Vu |= ψ1 → ψ2. ✷
Theorem 10. Let ϕ be an L→-formula. Then ϕ is HT valid if and only if tr(ϕ) is MEM valid.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 8 and Proposition 9 in the way given below:
(⇐=): Let (H, T ) be an HT model, then H ⊆ T ⊆ P. Now, construct a quadruple MT = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 as
in Proposition 8. By that proposition, MT is an MEM model, and since tr(ϕ) is MEM valid by assumption,
we have MT , H |= tr(ϕ). Finally, again by Proposition 8, H, T |= ϕ, i.e., (H, T ) is an HT model of ϕ.
(=⇒): Let M = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 be an MEM model and let w ∈ W . We have to go through two cases.
Case 1. Assume that T (w) \ {w} = ∅. By assumption, we know that (Vw, Vw) is an HT model of ϕ.
Therefore, by Proposition 9 we have M, w |= tr(ϕ).
Case 2. Suppose that T (w) \ {w} Ó= ∅. Then there exists a unique u such that T (w) = {w, u} is of
cardinality 2 (see Remark 2). Hence, Proposition 1.1 gives us Vw ⊆ Vu. Next, by hypothesis (Vw, Vu) is an
HT model of ϕ. Therefore, by Proposition 9, M, w |= tr(ϕ). ✷
5. From equilibrium logic to MEM
The same construction as for HT logic allows us to turn equilibrium models into MEM models.
Proposition 11. Let T ⊆ P, and let MT = 〈W, T ,S, V 〉 be a quadruple such that:
W = 2T ;
Vh = h, for every h ∈ W ;
T = ∆W ∪
(
W × {T}
)
;
S = ∆(W\{T}) ∪
(
{T} ×
(
W \ {T}
))
.
Then MT is an MEM model, and T is an equilibrium model of ϕ if and only if MT , T |= tr(ϕ)∧ [S]¬tr(ϕ),
for every L→-formula ϕ.
Proof. As we have already seen in Proposition 8, MT is a legal MEM model. So it remains to prove that
T is an equilibrium model of ϕ iff MT , T |= tr(ϕ) ∧ [S]¬tr(ϕ) for every L→-formula ϕ. We indeed have:
T is an equilibrium model of ϕ
iff T, T |= ϕ and H, T Ó|= ϕ for every H ⊂ T
iff MT , T |= tr(ϕ) and MT , H Ó|= tr(ϕ) for every H ⊂ T (by Proposition 8)
iff MT , T |= tr(ϕ) and MT , H |= ¬tr(ϕ) for every H such that TSH (because TSH iff H ⊂ T )
iff MT , T |= tr(ϕ) and MT , T |= [S]¬tr(ϕ)
iff MT , T |= tr(ϕ) ∧ [S]¬tr(ϕ). ✷
For example, consider the set T = ∅ and the L→-formula ϕ = ⊤. We have seen before that ∅ is the only
equilibrium model of ⊤. Let MT be the MEM model as constructed in Propositions 8 and 11. We know
that MT is a legal MEM model. We also deduce MT , T |= [T](tr(⊤) ∧ [S]¬tr(⊤)) following the conclusion
of Proposition 11 and the structure of the model. This can also be seen by simplifying the latter:
[T]
(
tr(⊤) ∧ [S]¬tr(⊤)
)
iff [T](⊤ ∧ [S]¬⊤)
iff [T][S]⊥.
We are now ready for the grand finale where we capture equilibrium logic in our bimodal logic, MEM.
Theorem 12. Let χ and ϕ be L→-formulas. Then χ |≈ ϕ if and only if
(
tr(χ) ∧ [S]¬tr(χ)
)
⊃ tr(ϕ)
is MEM valid.
Proof. We use Propositions 9 and 11. Let us abbreviate (tr(χ) ∧ [S]¬tr(χ)) ⊃ tr(ϕ) by ξ.
(=⇒): Assume ξ isn’t MEM valid. Hence there exists an MEM model M and a world w in M such
that:
M, w |= tr(χ) ∧ [S]¬tr(χ) ∧ ¬tr(ϕ) (∗).
If w were such a point satisfying T (w)\{w} Ó= ∅, then from (∗) we would immediately obtain a contradiction,
namely that M, w |= tr(χ) and also M, w Ó|= tr(χ) (by Remark 2 and the constraints wmconv(T ,S) and
refl2(S)). Hence we conclude that T (w) = {w}. Using (∗), it also turns out that M, w |= tr(χ) and M, w |=
¬tr(ϕ). Then Proposition 9 yields Vw, Vw |= χ and Vw, Vw Ó|= ϕ. If Vw = ∅ then we can easily deduce that Vw
is an equilibrium model of χ, so the result we are looking for trivially follows. Now consider the case where
Vw Ó= ∅. The point w cannot be a singleton point (otherwise and as noted before, it would then have an
empty valuation). First of all, we recall M, w |= [S]¬tr(χ) (∗∗), which is an immediate consequence of (∗).
Then, from (∗∗) we obtain M, u Ó|= tr(χ) for every u with wSu. Next, through the constraints neg(S, T ),
refl2(S) and mconv(S, T ) we get T (u) = {u, w} with u Ó= w, for any u with wSu. Hence, T (u)\{u} Ó= ∅, and
moreover w ∈ T (u) \ {u} is uniquely determined. Thus, using Proposition 9 we can assert that Vu, Vw Ó|= χ
for any u such that wSu. As a next step, by Proposition 2 we suppose w.l.o.g. that Vw is finite. Finally,
it remains to conclude that H, Vw Ó|= χ for any H with H ⊂ Vw: this is nothing but a consequence of
Proposition 1.2. We also know that Vw, Vw |= χ (see above). Hence, we again show the existence of an
equilibrium model of χ, namely Vw. Moreover Vw is such that Vw, Vw Ó|= ϕ (see above). Thus, we get χ |Ó≈ ϕ.
So, we are done.
(⇐=): Let ξ be MEM valid, and let T ⊆ P be an equilibrium model of χ. Now we construct the MEM
model, MT , as it is done in Proposition 11. Then we conclude that MT is a legal MEM model and that
MT , T |= tr(χ) ∧ [S]¬tr(χ) again by Proposition 11. Since ξ is MEM valid, MT , T |= ξ, but as MT is an
MEM model, we also have MT , T |= tr(ϕ). Finally, from Proposition 9 we obtain that T, T |= ϕ. Thus we
conclude that χ |≈ ϕ, and this ends the proof. ✷
Corollary 13. For every L→-formula χ, χ has an equilibrium model if and only if
tr(χ) ∧ [S]¬tr(χ)
is MEM satisfiable.
Here is an example. We have seen before that ⊤ |≈ ¬p for every p, i.e., ¬p is a consequence of ⊤ in
equilibrium models. Hence Theorem 12 tells us that the formula ξ = tr(⊤) ∧ [S]¬tr(⊤) ⊃ tr(¬p) must
be provable from the axioms and the inference rules of MEM. This can be established by the following
sequence of equivalent formulas. Before, we recall that in any normal modal logic, tr(⊤) is equivalent to ⊤
and tr(¬p) is equivalent to [T]¬p (see Section 4.1).
1. tr(⊤) ∧ [S]¬tr(⊤) ⊃ tr(¬p)
2. ⊤ ∧ [S]¬⊤ ⊃ [T]¬p (see above)
3. [S]⊥ ⊃ [T]¬p.
The last line is provable in our logic: indeed, we see below that [S]⊥ ⊃ [T]¬p can be proved in our logic
MEM by standard principles of modal logic.
1. 〈T〉(p ∧ ⊤) ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉(¬p ∧ ⊤) (axiom Neg([S], [T]))
2. 〈T〉p ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉¬p (from 1 by classical logic)
3. ¬p ⊃ ⊤ (tautology)
4. 〈T〉〈S〉¬p ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉⊤ (from 3 by K([T]) and K([S]))
5. 〈T〉p ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉⊤ (from 2 & 4)
6. p ⊃ 〈T〉p (axiom T ([T]))
7. p ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉⊤ (from 5 & 6)
8. 〈T〉p ⊃ 〈T〉〈T〉〈S〉⊤ (from 7 by K([T]))
9. 〈T〉〈T〉〈S〉⊤ ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉⊤ (axiom 4 ([T]))
10. 〈T〉p ⊃ 〈T〉〈S〉⊤ (from 8 & 9)
11. 〈T〉(〈S〉⊤ ∧ [S]〈S〉⊤) ⊃ 〈S〉⊤ (axiom WMConv([T], [S]))
12. [S](⊤ ⊃ 〈S〉⊤) (axiom T2([S]))
13. [S](〈S〉⊤ ⊃ ⊤) (axiom WTriv2([S]))
14. [S]〈S〉⊤ ≡ [S]⊤ (from 12 & 13 by K([S]))
15. [S]〈S〉⊤ ≡ ⊤ (from 14 by K([S]))
16. 〈T〉〈S〉⊤ ⊃ 〈S〉⊤ (from 11 & 15 by K([T]) and K([S]))
17. 〈T〉p ⊃ 〈S〉⊤ (from 10 & 16)
18. [S]⊥ ⊃ [T]¬p (from 17 by K([T]) and K([S])).
Therefore the original formula ξ is also provable in our logic.
6. Conclusion and further research
In this paper we have proposed a monotonic modal logic MEM that is powerful enough to characterise
the existence of an equilibrium model as well as consequence in equilibrium models. Its modal operators [T]
and [S] are interpreted in a fairly standard class of Kripke models. We have given a sound and complete
axiomatisation of our logic and we have shown that it can be checked whether χ |≈ ϕ, i.e., whether ϕ is a
logical consequence of χ in equilibrium logic, by checking if the modal formula
tr(χ) ∧ [S]¬tr(χ) ⊃ tr(ϕ)
is valid in MEM or not, where tr is a polynomial translation from the language of here-and-there logic
into MEM. The logic MEM thus captures the minimisation that is central in the definition of equilibrium
models and which is only formulated in the metalanguage there.
We had started the investigation of modal logics underlying equilibrium logic in two previous papers
[11,12]. Although we were also able to capture consequence in equilibrium models in the logic of [12], we
were not able to avoid the exponential growth of formula length when translating formulas of equilibrium
logic into our bimodal logic. The present logic MEM avoids that undesired growth. In both papers, what we
did for equilibrium logic parallels what Levesque did for autoepistemic logic: he also designed a monotonic
modal logic that was able to capture nonmonotonic autoepistemic reasoning [16,17].
Besides embedding a nonmonotonic logic into a monotonic logic, our logic has a further interesting
feature that may be exploited in future work: we can now apply well-known automated deduction methods
for modal logics [10,8,15,23,24] to equilibrium logic. We may use in particular our LoTREC tableau proving
platform [9]. The implementation of a tableau procedure for MEM requires a specific tableau rule that
does the following: for each subset of the set of propositional variables appearing in some node, create an
S-accessible node where all these variables are false.
In future work we plan to extend our approach in two ways. First, we would like to extend our language
with modal operators allowing to talk about belief, knowledge, action, and time, providing thus a com-
prehensive framework for extensions of answer-set programming by modal concepts. Only few approaches
exist up to now, essentially temporal extensions of equilibrium logic [1,4]. In particular, we plan to integrate
into MEM logic the modal operators of dynamic logic of propositional assignments DL-PA that we have
recently studied [2]. Propositional assignments set the truth values of propositional variables to either true
or false and update the current model in the style of dynamic epistemic logics. Our second research avenue
is to capture other nonmonotonic logics such as the nonmonotonic extension of S4F [21]. However, the very
next step is to study how DL-PA and MEM have to be combined. First results are in [13].
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